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VOLUME XIV. NOVEMBER 1939 NTMBER 4
RECENT STATUTORY CHANGES IN THE WASHINGTON
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
WA Nmz L. SHATTUCI*
THE WAiTiNG-PERIOD STATUTE
Chapter 204, Laws of 1939, repealing and re-enacting in different
form Rna. REv. STAT. § 8450, introduces four innovations into Wash-
ington marriage license practice. It provides for procurance of licenses
by non-residents of the state via mail. It creates, for all license appli-
cants, a period of delay between application and issuance of the
license. 2 It requires elicitation of designated information, not hereto-
fore required by statute, from all applicants.8 It gives legislative man-
date for the discretionary refusal of license by county auditors.4
The non-resident must acquire his license from the county in which
the marriage is to be performed but need not personally appear there
in order to get a license. Were this provision not included in the statute
such applicants would have to make two trips into the state or reside
here during the waiting period. Washington would become a less
desirable place for intermarriage by non-residents. Arguably, any
statute which encourages the practice of marrying outside the home
state is of doubtful social value because too frequently that state has
some marriage regulation which is sought to be evaded in this manner.
The objection fails where the non-resident is to marry a citizen of
Washington; the new law might well have limited the mail privilege
to such instances.
Chapter 204 authorizes issuance of the license only when three full
days have elapsed after application. This is not a new idea. A number
of states have similar enactments and some have had them for many
years. 5 Sociologists have long pointed out the diminished risk of the
marriage ending in separation or divorce where there is a delay after
formulation of the purpose to marry. The time interval itself dis-
courages hasty and ill-considered unions, particularly "gin" and "joke"
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.




81 Vunms, A2z CAc FAMrLY LAws (1931) § 16. A number of states
have enacted such statutes since Vernier's work was published.
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marriages. Where the interval follows application for a license addi-
tional benefits are claimed. The auditor is afforded an opportunity to
verify the application-an advantage over the old system only if he
does actually investigate, meaningless if he accepts at their face value
the affidavits furnished him. Relatives and other interested persons
are, theoretically, enabled to intervene where they regard the marriage
to be improper. The statute at this point appears definitely weak. The
intervention of third persons presupposes that they know the license
has been applied for. Since the license need not be obtained from the
county of the applicant's residence and since county auditors have been
known to withhold from reporters the facts regarding issuance of
licenses, this presupposition rests on a dubious foundation. The statute
should be amended, requiring publication of the fact of license appli-
cation, in some newspaper of general circulation " in the county of resi-
dence of each applicant.6
That there may be on occasion justification for dispensing with the
waiting period is recognized by the legislature, the superior court being
empowered to direct issuance of the license at any time after applica-
tion.7 No criteria for the judge are indicated in the statute; the courts
will undoubtedly interfere only where an emergency justifies.
Chapter 204 requires that the license issuer take from applicants
certain data,8 probably little different from that which auditors have
for some time been insisting upon without statutory direction, in addi-
tion to that necessary under REM. Ruv. STAT. § 8451. 9
County auditors have not been certain that they possess the power
to withhold a license which they have cause to believe is sought on
misrepresentations of fact or by an applicant who is under some im-
pediment. 10 This difficulty is solved for them in the new statute by
an express grant of such discretion, subject to review in the superior
court.
5'Quaere whether a newspaper "of general circulation" would be ade-
quate. See King County v. Superior Court, 99 Wash. Dec. 522, 92 P. (2d)
694 (1939).
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 204, § 5 provides: "Any such application shall be
open to public inspection as a part of the records of the office of such
county auditor, and all applications which have been filed within three
days shall be kept separately, and readily accessible to public examina-
tion." This seems to be a sort of recordation system, excellent so far as
it goes, but failing utterly to insure notice to those persons who might
come forward to protest against issuance of the license.
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 204, § 6.
'Name, address, age, color, occupation, birthplace, whether single, wid-
owed or divorced, whether under control of a guardian, residence during
the past six months, and the name and address of a person who can testify
that the residence is bona fJde. Individual counties are permitted by the
section to require additional information.
'This section requires affidavits regarding age, mental and physical
condition.
"See Young, An Evaluation of Washington Marriage Laws (1937) 12
WASH. L. REV. 112, 125.
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Chapter 204 gives us, in the waiting period section, a type of law
which is generally regarded as beneficial both to the parties contem-
plating marriage and to the public interest. We should be grateful
for this improvement in the marriage statutes, but not to the point of
overlooking the need for further reform. We are still inadequately
equipped to cope with the marriage of minors and of the mentally and
physically unfit. The decisions 1 which read all meaning out of R1m.
REv. STAT. 843712 and set as the minimum legal ages for marriage
in this state 14 years for males and 12 years for females should be
corrected by statute. The control over the marriage of minors which
can, theoretically, be exercised by the license issuer is not enough. The
indifferent or careless auditor will issue licenses to minors contrary
to REm. REv. STAT. § 8451;13 the conscientious auditor can be imposed
upon by appearances of maturity and false affidavits. The threat of
criminal prosecution for falsification of affidavits, of age has lost its
potency because so infrequently consummated. Under the Washing-
ton cases, the marriage itself is not vitiated by perjury in the affidavits
of age'4 and is perfectly valid if the parties are above the legal minimum
ages. Parents cannot contest the marriage even though the statement
of their consent be forged. 15 The statute should fix the minimum age
for legal marriage without parental consent, and the minimum with
such consent, with some attention to both eugenics and economics.
The license statute should be amended to conform. Parental inter-
vention by annulment proceedings should be permitted where the
marriage takes place contrary to the statutory age requirements. 8
"In re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159 (1909); Cushman v. Cush-
man, 80 Wash. 615, 142 Pac. 26 (1914); Tisdale v. Tisdale, 121 Wash. 138,
209 Pac. 8 (1922).
"'Marriage is a civil contract which may be entered into by males of
the age of twenty-one years, and females of the age of eighteen years, who
are otherwise capable."
1"He (the auditor) shall also require an affidavit of some disinterested
credible person showing that ... the female is over the age of eighteen
years and the male is over the age of twenty-one years; Provided, that if
the consent in writing is obtained of the father, mother, or legal guardian
of the person for whom the license is required, the license may be
granted in cases where the female is under the age of eighteen years or
the male is under the age of twenty-one years; Provided, that no consent
shall be given, nor license issued, unless such female be over the age of
fifteen years."
"See cases cited supra note 11. If the male was aged fourteen or more,
the female twelve or more, even though they were below the ages indi-
cated in P, ma. P, v. STAT. § 8451, the marriage cannot be annulled by any-
one for non-age.
tmIn re Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159 (1909), cited supra note 11.
6This is the rule in several states. 1 VEsmma, Aazn=icAN FAMILY LAws
(1931) § 51. RmW. REV. STAT. § 8449 now reads: "When either party to a
marriage shall be incapable of consenting thereto, for want of legal age
... such marriage is voidable, but only at the suit of the party laboring
under the disability . . ." (Italics mine.)
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We now have a code section which forbids marriage by indicated
physical and mental incompetents 17 and one which requires of appli-
cants for marriage licenses affidavits attesting their freedom from the
inhibited ailments."' Fear of criminal prosecution in the incompetent
and omniscience in the county auditor are thus the barriers erected
against the transmission of hereditary mental disorders to children
who will inevitably be social problems if not public charges, and the
infecting of an innocent spouse by one suffering at the time of marriage
with venereal disease. Insofar as this form of regulation is aimed at
mental incompetents it approaches absurdity. Insofar as it is aimed
at physical disease, suffice it to say that the auditor cannot be ex-
pected to discern such defects, and that criminal prosecutions for
violations of such statutes are almost unknown. The fear of prosecu-
tion is altogether too weak a barrier against the evils sought to be
prevented.19
Other states face this problem and an increasing number of them20
17REM. REv. STAT. § 8439.
'SREM. REV. STAT. § 8451. Section 8452 provides punishment for viola-
tion, "knowingly", of § 8439; § 8451 makes false swearing in the affidavits
required by the section perjury.
"But one instance of prosecution for perjury in the affidavits required
by REM. REV. STAT. § 8451 has come to my attention. That occurred in
1938 in King County. I have yet to hear of a prosecution under REM. RmE.
STAT. § 8452 for violation of § 8439. If readers are aware of other prosecu-
tions for violations of these sections, I would appreciate information about
them. Such statutes as REM. REV. STAT. §§ 8440 and 8454, which provide
punishment for marriage officiants who knowingly marry persons for-
bidden by § 8439 from marrying seem to be of little practical value.
2'The following table indicates the states which now require medical
examination and certification, and the scope of the examination. In addi-
tion to the states listed, I have been advised that Pennsylvania, South
Dakota and Tennessee enacted similar legislation during 1939. The session
laws of these states for 1939 are not yet available.
State Applicant Affected Scope
Alabama CODE 1928, § 1156. Male Venereal disease.
Colorado Laws 1939, c. 128. Both Venereal disease.
Illinois Laws 1937, p. 910. Both Venereal disease.
Indiana Laws 1939, c. 100. Both Venereal disease.
Louisiana GEN. STAT. (Dart. 1932)
§ 2180-2184. Male Venereal disease.
Michigan Laws 1937, c. 207. Both Venereal disease.
New Hampshire Laws 1937, c. 186. Both Venereal disease.
North Carolina Laws 1939, c. 314. Both Venereal disease,
tuberculosis, mental
diseases.
North Dakota Coir~n.m LAws 1913,
§ 4375. Male Venereal disease,
tuberculosis, mental
diseases.
Oregon CODE 1930, 33-118 et seq.;
Laws 1937, c. 434. Both Venereal disease.
Wisconsin STATUTES 1927, 245.10, 11;
Laws 1937, c. 311. Both Venereal disease.
Wyoming REV. STAT. 1931, § 103-
227. Male Venereal disease.
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are meeting it by statutes which, although varying in scope and detail,
are all grounded on the idea that the way to prevent a syphilitic from
marrying is to detect the disease when the license is applied for, and
refuse a license-in other words, that physical examination and certifi-
cation of freedom from those ailments which the legislature regards as
inimical to a socially desirable marriage should accompany the license
to marry.21 The doctor's certificate may not be an infallible shield
against improper license procuration. It is incomparably superior to
the applicant's affidavit, if the examinations are properly made. Co-
operation of the medical profession is vital to success of the certification
plan. Perfunctory examinations will defeat its whole purpose.22
Another type of statute, as yet uncommon, vests in some public
official in each county discretionary power to bring annulment pro-
ceedings against marriages which violate statutory requirements. 23
A few of these marriages will take place despite all precautions, and
in the absence of such a statute the parties can continue their marital
relations in the teeth of the statute which forbade them from marrying.
In the case of persons suffering from ailments which can be transmitted
to children surely the public interest justifies the intervention of a
public representative.2 4
-In 1909 the Washington legislature enacted a medical certification
statute (Wash. Laws 1909, c. 174, § 3); the chapter covered other marriage
regulations also. In the following extraordinary session a bill was passed
which covered the same ground as Chapter 174 and in identical language
save that the medical certification clause was omitted. Wash. Laws Ex.
Sess. 1909, c. 16. This implied repealer was followed in 1929 by an express
one. Wash. Laws 1929, c. 23, § 1. The motives actuating the special session
cannot now be determined. Possibly the provision repealed was ahead of
the times. Our ideas regarding the proper scope and value of social legisla-
tion have undergone various transformations since 1909.
' The matter of fees for such examinations has occasioned debate. Some
states set the maximum fee by statute, others do not. Doctors complain
that the statutory fee is inadequate, particularly where laboratory tests
are necessary. When the statute does not set the maximum fee, applicants
complain that fees are oppressive and arguments that the state should
bear the cost of examinations are heard.
'n1 Vrax-um, AavnicAx FAmY LAWS (1931) § 51 indicates two states
having such legislation. The circumstances under which one of the spouses
can secure annulment of the marriage by reason of his own physical or
mental incapacity, or that of the other spouse, and the problem of col-
lateral attack on the marriages of insane persons, are outside the scope
of this paper. Notice, however, In re Hollingsworth's Estate, 145 Wash.
509, 261 Pac. 403 (1927); Waughop v. Waughop, 82 Wash. 69, 143 Pac 444
(1914); PxzL REv. STAT. § 8449.
"Young, An Evaluation of Washington Marriage Laws (1937) 12 WASH.




Chapters 162 and 163, Laws of 1939, amended REM. REv. STAT.
Sections 1696, 1698 and several subsections of 1700. Section 1697
was repealed. It is the purpose of this paper to indicate the changes
made and to discuss briefly the purpose and effect of Sections 1700-1
et seq.
REM. REv. STAT. § 1696 confers jurisdiction on the superior courts
to decree adoption and sets out generally the conditions upon which
such decrees may be had. Chapter 163 makes two changes in this sec-
tion. Venue is invested in the county of the adoptee's residence. For-
merly only the county where the petitioner resided had venue. This
amendment subserves no vital purpose. It merely enables the petitioner
to proceed where the adoptee lives if this be more convenient.
The old statute made consent of a natural parent to the adoption
of a minor child unnecessary if he or she had been "unconditionally
deprived of custody and control of such child by the judgment or
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, in an action, suit or pro-
ceeding, in which such parent has been given notice and a right to be
heard". This provision has been important to parents deprived of
custody under the Juvenile Court Act" or in connection with divorce
or separate maintenance actions. The phrase "unconditionally de-
prived" occasions argument if the divorce or separate maintenance
decree divides custody between the parents, or awards custody to one
and stipulates that the other may visit the child. The 1939 amend-
ment resolves the difficulty by deleting this phrase and requiring con-
sent of both parents to the adoption in those cases in which the cus-
tody decree provided for divided custody or visitation. In so doing it
codifies the results which our court has been reaching.2 The amend-
ment says that consent of a parent is not necessary "where the child
shall have been awarded to the custody and control of the other
parent".' The words "of the other parent" are new and seem to mean
that the consent of a parent deprived of custody under the Juvenile
Court Act is now required save as proceedings in the juvenile court
have, in establishing parental abandonment or non-support of the
child, brought the case within REM. REv. STAT. § 1696 (4).1 If this be
the correct interpretation of the amendment, the change is to be
'REM. REV. STAT. § 1987-8, § 1987-9.
'In re Force, 113 Wash. 151, 193 Pac. 698 (1920); In re Walker, 170 Wash.
454, 17 P. (2d) 15 (1932).
'The italics are added.
'This subsection now reads: "From a father, or mother, who has been
found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have deserted or abandoned
such child without provision for his or her identification or support." The
phrase "or support" was added by Wash. Laws 1939, c. 163.
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applauded. It is in accordance with the general spirit of the juvenile
Court Act.8
If adoption involved merely a change in the child's custody, the rule
with regard to parental consent would work very well. But adoption
does much more. It destroys a status-that of parent and child, exist-
ing between the natural parent and his offspring. It creates a new
status of parent-child between the adopting parent and the child. The
parent who has lost the right to custody has the other incidents of
parenthood.6 And custody itself is not irrevocably lost. The decree
is always subject to change and many custody orders are modified in
response to changes in the circumstances. 7 If the spouse to whom
custody has been awarded dies, the other parent is entitled to again
have the child.8 Contests over children, incident to divorce and sep-
arate maintenance litigation, frequently turn on such things as the
age of the child, or the relative ability of the spouses to care for and
educate it, and not on misconduct or morel unfitness of one of the
contestants.9 Adoption destroys practically all hope of the natural
parent again regaining the child save through another adoption pro-
ceeding. A parent who has lost custody to the other spouse has
nevertheless so substantial an interest in the child that his consent
should be a requisite to its adoption.10
Rnm. Rv. STAT. § 1697, which required separate examination of
the wife with regard to her acquiescence, where husband and wife
petition together for adoption, is repealed by Chapter 163. The se'ction
had no utility and will not be missed.1 '
Rym. REv. STAT. § 1698 sets up criteria to be regarded by the court
in weighing the merits of an adoption petition-ability of the petitioner
to bring up and educate the child properly, the fitness and propriety
of the adoption. It is impossible in the larger counties and may be
5See REIvL REv. STAT. § 1987-14; State ex rel Everitt v. Superior
Court, 178 Wash. 90, 33 P. (2d) 897 (1934).
The parent, for example, will inherit from a child who died intestate
in another's custody. It is highly doubtful that he will inherit from a
child which has been adopted by another. The child in this jurisdiction,
however, will inherit from the natural parent even though adopted. In re
Roderick, 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325 (1930).
'See for example Clark v. Clark, 110 Wash. 293, 188 Pac. 456 (1920);
Sorge v. Sorge, 112 Wash. 131, 191 Pac. 817 (1920); Penny v. Penny, 151
Wash. 328, 275 Pac. 710 (1929). The principle of these cases is applicable
irrespective of whether the custody decree be absolute or provide for
visitation or for divided custody.
'In re Neff, 20 Wash. 652, 56 Pac. 383 (1899); In re Kneeland, 160 Wash.
64, 294 Pac. 562 (1930); Note (1931) 74. A. L. R. 1352.
'See for example Smith v. Smith, 15 Wash. 237, 46 Pac. 234 (1896);
Koontz v. Koontz, 25 Wash. 336, 65 Pac. 546 (1901); Freeland v. Freeland,
92 Wash. 482, 159 Pac. 698 (1916); Mason v. Mason, 163 Wash. 539, 1 P.
(2d) 885 (1931).
T'he law in other states is unsettled. See 4 VERm, Ao=mP NC FAWMy
LAws (1936) § 259; Note (1934) 91 A. L. R. 1387.
"Colorado is the only other state having a statute similar to the section
repealed. 4 VmuUnM, A_ nUcA Fmvn.y LAws (1936) § 259.
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difficult in even the smaller ones for the court to marshall the facts
upon which intelligent action on an adoption matter must be based.
The parties cannot usually be relied upon to present the needed in-
formation as the petition really becomes an adversary action. Chapter
163, Laws of 1939, recognizes this problem and authorizes the superior
courts to appoint investigators to advise them in adoption proceedings.
This amendment regularizes the procedure which has heretofore been
followed in a few counties and is in line with similar development in
other states.1 2 The statute is silent with regard to the source of pay-
ment for such advisors, or to the inclusion of their expenses in the costs
of the actions. The duration of the investigatory period is fixed by ref-
erence to REM. REv. STAT. § 1700-5.13
Section 1698 is further amended by Chapter 163 to provide that
denial of a petition for adoption shall be made only after notice to
interested parties and a hearing, which shall be private, and after
entry of a finding of fact.
It is impossible to comprehend Chapter 162, Laws of 1939, without-
some understanding of its background. The law amended is Chapter
150, Laws of 1935, brought into the code as REm. RIv. STAT. § 1700-1
et seq. The 1935 statute seemed to be directed at certain definite
objectives. It sought to control the practice of "baby-farming"-the
informal transfer of the person of a minor with the idea that the
transferee should have possession of it, the right to its earnings or work,
and be obliged to support it until majority;' 4 it also attempted to
control the practices of doctors and maternity home operators of sell-
ing or otherwise disposing of infants born under their care, and to
control the operations of orphanages and similar enterprises by re-
quiring them to keep records with regard to each child coming into
their hands. It was an amplification of REm. ComP. STAT. § 1700 which
covered some of these points to a lesser extent. Control over custody
transfers was gained in the 1935 law by making it unlawful to transfer
permanent custody of a minor child save on court order. We then had
and still have separate code treatment of guardianship, adoption,
habeas corpus, delinquent or dependent children and children of di-
vorced parents. These chapters are complete in themselves and each
involves as a part of its procedure the power to decree a transfer of
custody which will be effective until modification of the order. Each
of these is, however, permissive in nature, permissive in the sense that
the superior court is given jurisdiction and final action depends on
124 VERNIER, A2nRicAN FAmiY LAWS (1936) § 257.
"Section 1700-5 is discussed below.
"The agreements litigated in Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd,
9 Wash. 419, 37 Pac. 660 (1894); St. Clair v. Williams, 23 Wash. 552, 63
Pac. 206 (1900); In re Smith, 118 Wash. 1, 202 Pac. 243 (1921), are illus-
trative.
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the validity of the cause presented to the court. The Juvenile Court
Act, the divorce and habeas corpus statutes also expressly permit entry
of temporary custody orders pendente lite. Nothing in REm. REv. STAT.
§ 1700-1 as adopted in 1935 showed any purpose by the legislature
to trench upon these procedures. It simply required that one of them
be used where it was desired to transfer permanent control over a
minor. But some of the superior courts insisted that this statute intro-
duced a new element into adoption proceedings, that the child could
be handed over to the petitioner by the one having possession, pending
the final decree, only on an order of the court and that such a transfer
would otherwise be unlawful under Section 1700-1. This construction
of the 1935 statute is highly debatable.15 Such a transfer is not "per-
manent" either in fact or in purpose. It is temporary, contingent upon
adoption being decreed. In so far as Section 1700-1 requires a court
order before a transfer of permanent custody can lawfully be made,
the decree of adoption satisfies the requirement. So also does the
decree appointing a guardian or granting custody or committing a de-
linquent or dependent child satisfy the requirement. An adoptive
parent is, as a matter of law, entitled to custody just as is a person
to whom permanent custody has been decreed. A guardian of the
person will or will not be so entitled, depending on the terms of the
decree. The Juvenile Court Act specifically confers such right on -the
person or institution to whom the child is given. 6
Moreover, so far as the applicability of the 1935 statute is con-
cerned, there is no basis for distinguishing adoption from other litiga-
tion in which custody of a minor is in issue. On the reasoning of
the superior courts already mentioned, an order would be necessary
before the person in possession of a child could legally transfer that
possession pendente lite in every case involving custody. Under the
rulings of these courts, what is generally known as a "temporary
custody decree" became in certain instances a "relinquishment order".
And while we usually associate the temporary custody order with a
quarrel over possession of the child, the "relinquishment order" became
something which was required before a change, of possession ardently
desired by everyone interested could be legally-made.
The 1939 amendment's greatest importance lies in its inferential
approval of the construction given the 1935 statute by some superior
2"The language of § 1700-1 lends no support to this construction. Section
1700-4, reading in part: "No licensee of a maternity hospital, physician,
midwife or nurse or any other person shall undertake directly or indi-
rectly to dispose of infants by placing them In family homes for adoption
or otherwise, until after the order of relinquishment shall become final",
seems properly to mean simply that the designated persons shall not
undertake to dispose of children save through a recognized judicial pro-
ceeding such as adoption or the Juvenile Court Act procedure.
'lRnLa Rv. STAT. § 1987-8, § 1987-9.
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courts as discussed above. The amendment assumes that relinquish-
ment orders are necessary under R.ir. REv. STAT. § 1700-1 and regu-
lates them. Interestingly enough, the regulation is in part merely a
device employed to achieve an entirely unrelated goal-that of limiting
the time which the court can consume in pondering over an adoption
petition. REM. REv. STAT. § 1700-1 et seq. is now a hodge-podge. It
continues the objectives of the 1935 statute. It superimposes the new
relinquishment order procedure, surely on adoption, and arguably on
all litigation involving custody of infants. It regulates the relinquish-
ment order to some extent. It tries to speed up adoption proceedings.
A dubious construction of Section 1700-1 was crystallized into law in
order to solve some of the problems that construction was creating
in the superior courts. The new hybrid chapter, however, raises more
difficulties than it settles.
Chapter 162 does two things specifically. REM. REv. STAT. § 1700-1
forbids permanent change in the custody of a minor child save upon
court order. REm. REV. STAT. § 1700-4 forbids any person from under-
taking "directly or indirectly to dispose of infants by placing them in
family homes for adoption or otherwise, until after the order of relin-
quishment shall become final." The amendment removes from the
operation of these sections those cases in which one spouse is under-
taking the adoption of a child of the other. It was necessary because,
under the relinquishment order procedure, Section 1700-1 was thought
to forbid a petitioner for adoption from taking the child into his home
pending action on the petition even though the child was that of the
petitioner's spouse.
The amendment also greatly expands REm. REV. STAT. § 1700-5.
This subsection formerly read: "No order for the relinquishment of
any minor child shall become final or binding until the expiration of
ten days from the entering of such order," and evidently meant that
any decree transferring permanent custody should be provisional for
ten days and thereafter final without further order. The new statute
provides that upon the filing of a petition for adoption the court "shall
enter its order of relinquishment and transfer forthwith: Provided,
There is filed with the petition the written waiver of the parent or
parents of the person to be adopted." The section says nothing about
when such an order shall be entered in other types of proceeding
involving custody. The proviso is important because it apparently
excludes those petitions in which the child sought to be adopted is in
the hands of an institution,"7 or is orphaned or abandoned. The value
"It may have been contemplated by the draftsmen here that orphan-
ages and such institutions, vested with power to consent to adoptions
under the Juvenile Court Act (Rmv. REv. STAT. § 1987-9), would come with-
in the designation of "parent" as used in the amendment. If so, it would
have been better to have expressly so provided. In Rr¢. RIv. STAT. § 1696.
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of this part of the amendment, which is directed at speeding things
up in adoption actions, is questionable. If court control over pendente
lite custody changes be desirable at all, entry of relinquishment orders
should always be discretionary with-the court. The parent's consent
does not mean ipso facto that the change is for the child's benefit.
Under the-amendment the order becomes a matter of right if accom-
panied by such consent.
The 1939 amendment further purports to fix at ten days the period
of investigation after a relinquishment order has been entered. This is
at once qualified by a proviso: "If the court shall be satisfied that ten
days is an insufficient period in which to make the necessary investiga-
tion, then the time may be extended not to exceed ninety days." The
amendment continues: "It being intended by this section to fix and
define the period of time during which the court may make or cause
to be made the investigation to determine the fitness and propriety of
relinquishment, transfer, or adoption." It is apparently hoped by this
provision to prod the court's advisor, and that the ninety-day exten-
sion will be available only for cause shown. Shown by whom? The
advisor? Is there to be a hearing? Notice that statutory provision
for an advisor is found only in the adoption and Juvenile Court Acts.
The new statute could have been amplified here to advantage, indicat-
ing precisely the procedure by which ten days will be extended into
one hundred days.
The mechanics used by the draftsmen for determining the period
of investigation are interesting. The order of relinquishment is said
not to be final until the investigatory period indicated above has
elapsed, leaving to inference the correlative that it shall be final
after such time even though the court has not actually completed its
investigation; but the amendment goes on to say that the order of re-
linquishment shall also not be final "until an order for adoption shall
have been entered." The 100-day maximum is an attempt to control
the time during which the court may investigate but does not fix the
time within which the adoption decree must be entered. It is accord-
ingly not clear just what is going to prevent the court from investigat-
ing as long as it pleases. Of course in most instances the court, having
before it the report of its investigator, will not unduly delay action
thereafter. But if it appear expedient to do so the court can, despite
this amendment, continue indefinitely its inquiry into the circum-
stances. Any attempt to speed up the ordinary case and leave open
"parent" is evidently used in its normal connotation, and a separate pro-
vision, without exceptions, is made for the consent of the guardian, if any,
of the child sought to be adopted. The orphanage seems more accurately
to be a guardian, not a parent. That a guardian may be in loco parentis
for some purposes hardly justifies the assumption that the term "parent"
as used in Chapter 162 will be construed to mean "guardian" as well.
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a means whereby the unusual one can be given the time it requires-
which seems to be the aim of the draftsmen-will be productive of
confusion where that purpose is not expressly set out. The phraseology
of the amendment is at this point very cumbersome. Moreover, since
the evils of delay are present in any instance where custody of a
minor is in issue, the phrase above, "until an order for adoption
shall have been entered", should have been made to read: "until an
order for adoption or of permanent transfer of custody . . ." The
amendment of REM. REv. STAT. § 1700-5 was apparently prepared with-
out recognition of the fact that custody issues reach the courts in a
variety of ways, as an accompaniment of divorce, separate maintenance
and guardianship litigation, and in direct actions for custody, as well
as in adoption; and that if REM. REV. STAT. § 1700-1 forbids voluntary
interim transfers of possession in one such type of proceeding, it must
forbid such transfers in all of them.
The 1939 amendment of Section 1700-5, as a part of its regulation
of relinquishment orders, attempts to define the status of the child
affected thereby. Until the order has become "final", 18 "the child shall
continue to all intents and for all purposes the child of the person or
persons so relinquishing or transferring as if no order had been en-
tered." Had the relinquishment order been recognized as merely a
decree of temporary custody under another name, this provision would
have been unnecessary. A temporary custody order leaves the status
of the child unchanged, simply because the order is temporary. If we
label such a decree "relinquishment order", we have something new
and strange and of course doubt about what happens if the order
does not become final at once appears. The draftsmen surely intended
that the relinquishment order transfer a right to possession of the child
pendente lite. The language of the amendment is then more sweeping
than is consonant with that purpose as the child is not "for all pur-
poses the child of the person so relinquishing" while the relinquishment
order is outstanding.
Chapter 162 contains an additional provision: "In the event no order
for adoption is entered but the court determines from its investigation
that the welfare of the child requires, then the court may order said
child committed as a dependent child." The language of the amend-
ment is not clear. Is it contemplated that the child is to be "com-
"The amendment uses the term "final" in connection with relinquish-
ment orders as though it meant something. In fact it is meaningless. The
order amounts to no more than a direction that the person of the child
be surrendered pendente lite. It never becomes "final" in the sense that
the surrender so directed will become permanent; permanent custody is
decreed if at all as a part of the principal litigation before the court.
The relinquishment order is surely subject to modification at any time,
both before and after the period of investigation set in the statute has
passed.
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mitted" as under R~x¢. Rnv. STAT. § 1987-8, even though no hearing
pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act has been had, and even though, as
in the larger counties, another department exercises the functions of the
juvenile court? Or does the amendment mean that the proceedings
shall be transferred to the juvenile court just as though a petition had
been filed under REm. Rav. STAT. § 1987-5?
It is perhaps desirable that the superior courts supervise every change
of possession of a minor intended by the parties to be a permanent
change with transfer of the legal rights and responsibilities which con-
stitute "custody". Rar. R~v. STAT. § 1700-1 et seq. as enacted in
1935, plus the guardianship, adoption, divorce, habeas corpus and
juvenile court statutes adequately accomplished that purpose.
The need for supervision over changes in possession of a minor pend-
ing litigation directly or inairectly involving its custody may or may
not exist. In some instances it will be proper that the change be made,
in others not. The child's welfare should control. The power of the
court to decree temporary custody is dear. Maybe the court and
not the parties should have the say, and maybe such a decree should
be made a requisite to the change. If so, a statute expressly and specifi-
cally so providing would much more dearly and simply achieve that
objective than does REM. REv. STAT. § 1700-1 et seq. as these sections
now read.
Careful investigation of the circumstances is necessary in any case
where permanent custody of a child is in issue. The authorization for
appointment of an advisor by the superior court, contained in Chapter
163, is limited to adoption proceedings. A separate and general author-
ization would have been more appropriate.
Delay in any case involving custody of a minor child frequently
works great hardship, far greater than delay in other civil litigation.
Some limitation on the time which the superior court can take to reach
a decision may be proper. To frame a statute so dictating, which
would be both rigid and flexible, is no simple matter.
Chapter 162 represents a drive on certain difficulties which lawyers,
in some counties at least, were encountering. It is regrettable that
the method of attack used was to engraft upon REm REv. STAT. §
1700-1, § 1700-4, and § 1700-5, the curatives deemed expedient. The
resultant composite is puzzling and involved.
The various Washington statutes which deal with children have,
like Topsy, "just growed". Some of them need redrafting. Moderm
and sensible statutory treatment of the problems of illegitimate children
is needed. The adoption statute should be amended to make adoption
decrees subject to revision, inasmuch as defects in the adopted child
or in the adopting parent, which make the adoption socially undesirable,
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are not always ferreted out before entry of the adoption order. The
divorce statute should be amended to require segregation in divorce
decrees between the sum awarded the wife for her support, and the sum
awarded to her for the support of the child, custody over which has
been decreed to her. Adoption, custody and juvenile court matters
frequently tend to dovetail, and correlation of the several statutes cov-
ering each would be worth while. There are no doubt other points
at which an overhauling of these statutes would be of great benefit
to the state and which could be ascertained by inquiry among the bar
and the several judges. The need for redrafting and correlating these
various statutes would seem to merit the careful consideration of the
Washington Bar.
